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 Introduction 
 Anytime world leaders meet, the stakes are high: both in terms of policy outcomes as well 
as in terms of event security. A trip down memory lane takes us from the streets of Genova 
in 2001, where massive protests resulted in many injured and one death, to the recent 
2017 G20 meeting in Hamburg, when the charming old harbor area turned into a down-
town battlefi eld. Summits simultaneously represent infl ammable political controversy and 
potential global agreement. By nature, international summits attract demonstrators and 
global media attention for their issues and attempts to infl uence negotiations between 
political leaders. 
 The presence of so many heads of government requires the most extreme security meas-
ures which makes summits high security events. Meanwhile, the national host tries to 
organize a successful conference in a comfortable atmosphere, arrange for the complex 
logistics of delegates, respect protestors’ civil rights and limit the consequences of security 
operations in terms of mobility and restrictions for its own citizens. 
 Securing summits is a daunting task where things can go dramatically wrong. Vio-
lent protests during previous summits in Prague (IMF Annual Meeting, September 2000), 
Nice (European Council, December 2000), Gothenburg (EU Council, June 2001), Genoa 
(G8 Summit, July 2001), Copenhagen (UN Climate Summit, December 2009), and Seoul 
(Nuclear Security Summit 2012) are cases in point. Despite variation in the previous cases 
regarding local protest cultures and security approaches, these demonstrations all ended 
in violent clashes between protestors and police, resulting in hundreds of arrests, use of 
unprecedented force by police units, and millions of euros in damages caused by vandal-
ism and casualties among the protestors. 
 As such, summits are potential “crises in the making.” Yet not all summits become 
crises. In this chapter, we argue that much can be learned from collaboration in the crisis 
preparation phase and its effects on the outcome of summits in terms of security. Incident 
evaluations after Gothenburg, Nice, Genoa, and Prague in the early 2000s hint at a variety 
of organizational factors that pertain to crisis preparedness. These include a lack of coop-
eration between the actors involved, a lack of calibrating responsibilities and mandates, 
blind spots and hubris on behalf of responsible authorities, and limited (inter)national 
and inter-organizational learning in preparing for high security events (Cf.  Hansén and 
Hagström 2004 ;  SOU 2002 , 122;  Wallmann 2006 ;  KAMEDO 2001 ). 
 Global summits are examples of collaborative crisis management as they are potentially 
disruptive events that exceed the capacity of any single organization to manage the secu-
rity situation alone (see introductory chapter). Hitherto studies on security events such as 
summits have been confi ned to the domain of policing, from the perspective of “liminal 
events” ( Boersma 2013 ) or to the domain of sociology with a focus on protest dynamics in 
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the realm of social movement theory and contentious politics (see, e.g.,  Tilly and Tarrow 
2012 ). A focus on summits from a crisis management perspective is new, and it can yield 
important clues on the prevention of and response to violent clashes. 
 Summits as Crises? 
 Arranging a secure and smoothly organized summit while respecting civil rights is a 
balancing act that resembles the many challenges of collaborative crisis management. 
The authors in the introductory chapter rightly state that crisis collaboration enjoys 
increasing popularity in scholarly research, but its share in published output is still lim-
ited despite its relevance ( Kuipers and Welsh 2017 ). In a context of continuous threats, 
urgency and confl icting interests, a network (often  ad hoc ) has to provide public safety 
and reliability of critical infrastructures under conditions of high uncertainty. Summits 
are latent crises, and as they occur regularly, they seem more comparable than most 
extreme events. Authorities can prepare and plan better because summits have a lead 
time. Summits provide an opportunity for learning because the next event is usually 
scheduled before the current one is over. Summits allow us to study the conditions for 
collaboration in relation to security outcomes. Even though all the ingredients for a cri-
sis to occur may be present, some summits are carried out calmly whereas others end up 
in chaos. Public evaluations, intense media scrutiny, and detailed bureaucratic record-
keeping on each summit (calm or chaos) provide rich documentation for comparative 
case studies. 
 Judging success or failure of governance – in this case collaborative crisis governance – 
is of course an inherently political act, “because political actors, such as interest groups, 
politicians, journalists and voters are the main judges” ( Bovens, ‘t Hart, and Peters 2001 , 
10). In this study, we base our review of success and failure in the cases under study on 
the verdicts of others, such as the previously mentioned actors for each case. Bovens et al. 
conclude that good government, which comes close to our idea of successful collaborative 
crisis governance, entails 
 working one’s way through a complex series of challenges in the most effective and 
politically sensitive manner possible. When doing so, people in governments would be 
working with incomplete information . . . and would be attempting to please a public 
with diverse and often confl icting values. These governments would also be faced with 
a number of internal governance problems, not the least of which is attempting to coor-
dinate the activities of the numerous organizations working within the public sector. 
 ( 2001 , 657–58) 
 Later,  Bovens (2010 ) presents a useful distinction to evaluate success and failure in 
policymaking: between how a policy came about and what it entails (the locus of the 
study: process versus outcome), and between success from a political or a programmatic 
perspective (the focus of the study: legitimacy gained versus goals attained) ( Bovens 
2010 , 584–85). 
 In this study on summits, we say that the cooperation and coordination of network 
partners during a summit fails when either the collaborative network falls apart (process 
failure) or when the network collaboration produces predominantly unintended or nega-
tive results or consequences (outcome failure). Failure in terms of summit security from a 
programmatic perspective would be breaches to security of political executives. Failure in 
terms of legitimacy include civil unrest, violation of rights, eruptions of violence leading 
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to damage and casualties in public space, use of force toward citizens by law and order 
authorities, and decline of trust in public authorities and their work. A combination of 
these would constitute a local, national or international crisis depending on the levels of 
governance involved and on the severity of the incident(s). 
 Each case can be evaluated as success or failure regarding the locus and focus intro-
duced by  Bovens (2010 ). We will compare a summit that could be characterized as a 
violent, disruptive event (G20 Toronto in 2010) to a case of similar threat, size, and scope 
that occurred relatively calmly (NSS The Hague in 2014). Although both summits had 
successful outcomes from a programmatic security perspective (all heads of state par-
ticipated unhindered and returned home unharmed), they were not equally successful in 
terms of legitimacy. 
 Why is it that some collaborative networks result in failed outcomes during high pro-
fi le security events whereas others do not? What we will probe into is whether the col-
laborative process was smooth or rugged (programmatic success/failure) and whether it 
was inclusive and responsive or not (legitimacy success/failure). As we will outline later, 
collaboration in preparation of summits brings together a set of actors similar to those 
cooperating in crisis and disaster response. The fault lines that impede cooperation and 
coordination are also similar, and variation in the cases along these fault lines can help to 
explain the different outcomes. 
 Cooperation and Collaboration in Crisis: Focus on Fault Lines 
 “Decades of research on the subject have demonstrated that effective cooperation under 
crisis conditions is unlikely to emerge by itself” ( Boin and ‘t Hart 2012 , 183). The scale 
and scope of the threat or damage, the fact that crises respect no territorial or functional 
boundaries, and above all the different types of actors involved are among the key chal-
lenges that crises pose (Bynander and Nohrstedt, this volume). Summit actors come from 
within and from outside government organizations, bringing different perspectives, inter-
ests and resources to the table. Many of these actors are new to the safety and security 
fi eld. And yet they need to collaborate to produce an effective response to the crisis or 
threat at hand ( Boin and ‘t Hart 2012 ). In these networks, cooperation is most likely 
involuntary and defi ned by political responsibility ( Moynihan 2012 ). Among the invol-
untary networks,  Kenis and Provan (2009 ) distinguish between the ones led by a hierar-
chically superior actor (the “lead organization network”) and the ones coordinated by a 
“network administrative organization.” 
 Cooperation between actors in a collaborative crisis network has vertical and 
horizontal dimensions ( Moynihan 2012 ). Vertical relationships pertain to hierarchy 
between network partners: central agencies and line or niche departments, national 
and local or regional authorities, and chief executives with their strategic staffs as well 
as operational commanders and their units. Horizontal relations exist between actors 
that are interdependent but have no authority (formal or de facto) over each other. 
 Table 3.1 Assessment of success of G20 and NSS 
 Programmatic perspective  Legitimacy perspective 
Process  Both +  G20: +/-; NSS: ++ 
Outcome  Both ++  G20: --; NSS: ++ 
Source: Table Created by Authors 
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Cooperation between public authorities and private actors (such as NGOs, business 
fi rms, interest groups) come to mind but also relationships between actors at an equal 
level of authority (such as two regional police units or two ministries are horizontal). 
A Network Administrative Organization (NAO) could be helpful here ( Kenis and Pro-
van 2009 ). 
 While relating to each other along the horizontal and vertical dimensions, the actors 
in the network can also be fi tted neatly into Dynes’ boxes of established, extending, 
expanding, and emerging organizations in the crisis and security fi eld (see  Dynes 1970 , 
in the introductory chapter for explanation of each category). Though Dynes originally 
discerned between organizations responding to disasters, the typology applies well to 
security networks preparing for summits. Established organizations (type I) are the rou-
tine security partners such as police and counterterrorism units. Extending organizations 
are those (public) organizations involved in hosting and accommodating the summit, 
the “type II bureaucracies” that  Boin and ‘t Hart (2012 ) routinely refer to. Expand-
ing organizations (type III) would be existing private organizations with some interest 
or involvement in the summit operation, organization or outcome (fi rms, NGOs, and 
interest groups). Finally, emerging organizations (type IV) are  ad hoc groups of demon-
strators, protesters, residents or other citizens that react to the summit in some newly 
organized form. 
 Boin and ‘t Hart (2012 ) identify several collaboration fault lines. We regroup them here 
into three categories. First, fault lines seem to occur when  cultures clash (between different 
organizational styles such as type I command and control type organizations versus type 
II confederations of diplomats). Second, fault lines also occur when crises cross functional 
boundaries and tasks are not covered, and when  problem frames are set too narrow (cre-
ating discussions between type I and II organizations on who assumes responsibility for 
what, or disputes between insiders – type I and II – versus outsiders – type III and IV). 
Third, fault lines prevail when  single perspectives rule (short-term not long-term, national 
focus with disregard for local interests, and strategic considerations versus operational 
demands) and when actors of different types do not fi nd common ground during the col-
laboration process. 
 What we expect to see in the cases is that the composition of the network, the coopera-
tion between the actors, and the content of the joint planning and operations refl ect how 
the collaborative network has dealt with the previously mentioned fault lines that are 
likely to occur between different types of organizations. The prevalence of fault lines in the 
cases is related to the outcome (violent or peaceful summit) in our analysis and discussion. 
 Research Design 
 This study is a structured, focused comparison of two cases ( George and Benett 2005 ). 
Our cases focus on the middle zone between long-term collaborations in managing 
public policy and the  ad hoc prevention and management of crises. Organizing an inter-
national summit usually takes one to two years of preparation and involves threats, 
uncertainty, and high stakes regarding security matters. An international summit some-
times materializes into a public order crisis and sometimes not. Our cases involve the 
wide spectrum of security related actors and representatives from sectors affected by 
security measures. These actors participate in a network, and they each bring their own 
organizational values and interests, which may be implicit and inherently confl icting 
( Owen et al. 2016 ). Moynihan points out that involuntary participation in public ser-
vice networks (such as the collaborative security networks in our study) may increase 
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each participant organization’s concerns about extra-network reputation and organi-
zational values, as opposed to reciprocity norms that usually bind voluntary networks 
( Moynihan 2012 , 568, 573). 
 We do not study the diplomatic outcome of the selected cases (i.e., the treaty content), 
nor did we study operational and tactical decisions during the summits. We selected two 
summits: one summit that – in spite of intense network cooperation – was perceived as a 
security drama, a civil rights nightmare, and a logistical standstill, and another summit 
that in terms of civil rights, logistics, and security, ran smoothly (in the eyes of media and 
the respondents, according to the formal evaluations). This allows us to probe into the col-
laborative practices in preparation of these summits to see what infl uenced the difference 
in outcome in terms of public order and security. 
 Of course, collaborating authorities responsible for security operations during inter-
national summits do not fully impact the security threats they face. Anti-establishment 
groups may or may not decide autonomously (uninfl uenced by considerations regard-
ing security measures) to demonstrate during a summit, and the intensity and size of 
their demonstration and ultimately rioting efforts may vary. Part of the explanation 
may also be anticipation: rioters decide not to mobilize because of expected police 
presence and security barriers. While the advanced announcement of such measures 
could be seen as part of successful preparation and communication by the summit’s 
host, we cannot control for the autonomous decisions made by rogue individuals or 
groups. 
 We compare the two cases in a qualitative case study design to examine whether col-
laboration in the governing networks responsible for security and logistics before and 
during the summits reveal striking differences that may relate to the diverging case out-
comes. We look into what fault lines were present in the cases, and the ways these col-
laborative networks dealt with these fault lines can be connected to the overall outcomes 
of the cases. 
 The outcomes of collaboration in the security management of a summit are compared 
on dimensions such as security, public order, civil rights, and mobility. It is important to 
consider all these dimensions because they are inherently confl icting. Security and public 
order are much easier to guarantee if constitutional rights can be disregarded (for instance 
when all protests and demonstrators are banned from the wider area surrounding the 
summit), and if all local mobility can be optimally restricted. Vice-versa, if both citizen 
rights and their mobility have to be respected, the risks that demonstrators or even terror-
ists can disturb a summit are much higher. 
 Data Collection 
 Data for the study was collected in two steps. First, a content-analysis of all relevant 
(public) evaluations from offi cial government sources, media sources (through Lexis-
Nexis searches) and independent inquiries were coded in NVivo to get an idea of the 
key characteristics of both cases in terms of the policy process and the policy out-
comes of the summits in terms of (1) security, (2) public order, (3) constitutional rights, 
(4) mobility, and (5) resources. 1 The second step included semi-structured interviews 
with key respondents of both cases. In the interviews, we asked respondents about the 
relations between key stakeholders in the preparation phase, the prior relationships 
between key stakeholders, the formal structure of the summit preparation organiza-
tion, the timeline, and the perceived successes and failures in the collaboration pro-
cess. The 26 interviewees were identifi ed either by their names appearing in the key 
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documents used for the content analysis or by snowball sampling (see list of respond-
ents in Appendix I). All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded by both 
authors independently using NVivo. 
 Description of the Cases: NSS the Hague Versus G20 Toronto 
 The G20 Toronto Summit in June 2010 was the fourth in a line of G20 meetings addressing 
global fi nance and economic issues. Its theme “Recovery and New Beginnings” referred to 
the aim to overcome the ongoing economic worldwide recession. The G20 Toronto Sum-
mit was combined with a G8 Summit held immediately prior in nearby rural Huntsville. 
Together, the summits represented the largest and most expensive security operation in 
Canadian history. Both summits were criticized for being many times more costly than 
similar events in the UK and in Japan ( Chase 2010 ). 
 The Hague’s Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014 was the largest security opera-
tion the Netherlands ever hosted. This NSS 2014 was the third in a row, preceded by 
Nuclear Security Summits in Washington DC (2010) and Seoul (2012). Though the aim 
of the summits was to improve global nuclear safety, the prior summit in South Korea had 
sparked off violent protests. The NSS in The Hague was combined with a G7 summit that 
took place on the same premises the same week. 
 The cases are highly comparable in the sense that they both took place in the post-9/11 
era, they were preceded by similar summits in other countries that instigated violent dem-
onstrations, they were organized in a densely populated city center and they put similar 
demands on policing capacity. The summits were similar in terms of political controversy 
and terrorist threat. Neither of the host countries had experienced violent protests during 
previous summits. Both summits were hosted in metropolitan areas and preceded by a G7/
G8 summit back to back to the larger summit. At both events, over 20,000 security offi c-
ers were deployed during the operations, parts of the city centers (where the summits were 
held) were entirely sealed off with fences, and the summits paralyzed regional logistics for 
three consecutive days. 
 The Netherlands scores much higher than Canada in studies on protest demonstrations 
and activism, with self-reported activism among respondents scoring 32% in the Nether-
lands (ranking 3rd, which is comparable to Sweden: ranking 2nd with 35%) against 19% 
in Canada (ranking 14th), which is more comparable to South Korean scores (14%, rank-
ing 18th) ( Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005 , 199). 
 Yet, the Toronto Summit attracted 9,000 protesters and resulted in over 600 reported 
incidents and more than 1,000 arrests, whereas The Hague Summit occurred rather 
peacefully. The protests in downtown Toronto addressed generic issues as globaliza-
tion, capitalism, and gay rights and further escalated during the summit itself. What 
started off as peaceful demonstrations, led to increasing protests and the use of  black 
bloc tactics once the summit offi cially started ( The Star 26 June 2010 ). Shops and 
businesses in downtown Toronto were vandalized. Security was subsequently tight-
ened, which further escalated the aggression exerted against the police offi cers near 
the temporary detention facility where 500 protesters were being detained. In total, 
more than 1100 people were arrested during the week of the summit. Riot police 
and protesters clashed, and tear gas and plastic bullets were used to push back the 
protesters ( The Globe 28 June 2010 ). After the Toronto Summit, at least nine formal 
investigations into police operations were conducted. The costs of the G8-G20 secu-
rity amounted up to 930M Canadian dollars all together ( Offi ce of the Parliamentary 
Budget Offi ce 2010 ). 
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 Table 3.3 Outcomes in terms of experienced unrest 
 G20  NSS 
Number of protesters  9000  +/- 800 
Number of reported incidents   600      7 
Number of arrests  1100     75 
Number of injured security personnel    75     19 
Source: Table Created by Authors 
 Toronto G20: Violence Met With Violence 
 When the Harper administration announced in June 2008 that the next G8 summit would 
be held on June 25 and 26, 2010, in Huntsville, Ontario, the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) assumed general responsibility for the security of the event. They started 
planning for the event with Chief Superintendent Alphonse MacNeil in the lead. The Peel 
Regional Police (PRP, Toronto airport jurisdiction), the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP, 
jurisdiction travel routes of delegation) and the Canadian Forces (CF, general patrolling) 
all became members of the G8 steering committee and the Integrated Security Unit (ISU). 
The Toronto Police Service (TPS) was also part of the ISU, responsible for the media center 
of the G8 in Toronto. Huntsville, three hours north of Toronto, is a small town; thus, 
planning for the event progressed relatively smoothly between the security partners. 
 In December 2009, the Harper administration announced that the G8 summit would 
be held back-to-back with a G20 summit on June 26 and June 27, 2010. In Febru-
ary, they announced the venue: the Metro Toronto Convention Centre (MTCC) in the 
midst of the downtown fi nancial district. This news changed everything (interview 19). 
Although the TPS was already part of the steering committee, they suddenly became a 
lead agency because the city of Toronto became the primary event location. Confusion 
reigned on the role of TPS, RCMP and the other partners but no formal changes were 
made regarding the overall responsibility for the security of the event. The prime min-
ister’s offi ce had overall responsibility for hosting the G20. They set up a Summit Man-
agement Offi ce (SMO), responsible for the organization of the G20 Summit and for the 
coordination of the federal agencies. The RCMP, as the lead law enforcement agency at 
the federal level, was responsible for the overall security of both the G8 and G20 Sum-
mits. Information from the prime minister’s offi ce was sent to the RCMP and then down 
to the other partners. This was problematic for the network because information was not 
shared easily among security partners. Furthermore, the fact that the summits were held 
back to back hindered the mobilization and deployment of staff needed in both Hunts-
ville and Toronto. 
 The Harper administration’s late announcement of the G20 Summit and the additional 
venue left the federal, provincial, and city authorities with only four months to plan for 
the G20. As a result, planning was rushed, information was inadequate, and time for 
training and preparing operational staff was limited. In terms of security within the city of 
Toronto, RCMP was responsible for the security of all political leaders and diplomats and 
took over the jurisdiction of downtown Toronto. 2 The overarching goal of the RCMP was 
to organize a safe and secure summit for the Internationally Protected Persons (IPP’s). The 
RCMP closed off the summit’s security zones (3–4 square miles) for the public by putting 
up 10-feet high fences. This severely disrupted city life in Toronto. Businesses were tem-
porarily closed or moved, public transport was disrupted, and major thoroughfares were 
closed ( OIPRD 2012 ). 
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 The Toronto Police Service controlled the outer zones. In these zones, public order 
issues unfolded resulting in violent protests and riots starting on June 26. The TPS offi c-
ers in these zones received support from the OPP and RCMP offi cers who operated under 
the command of the TPS. The riots escalated to a point that the TPS chief commanders 
decided to “take back the streets.” The use of force by both police and protestors further 
escalated, leading to a vicious circle of “violence to be met with violence” ( OIPRD 2012 ). 
Over the course of the summit, more than 1,100 people were arrested and detained in the 
temporary Prisoner Processing Center. Several independent inquiries reported that these 
detainments resulted in severe human rights violations. 
 Media reports paid little attention to the content of the summit. Instead, they reported 
on the high security fences, massive police presence, large groups of demonstrators, pro-
testers employing  black bloc tactics, vandalism, and excessive violence between police and 
protestors. Yet most police respondents assert that, given the scope of the security opera-
tion, the number of jurisdictions involved, and the short notice, policing was carried out 
very well. 
 The Hague NSS: Dignified, Secure, and Peaceful 
 When the Netherlands agreed in 2012 to U.S. President Barack Obama’s request to host 
the third global Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, The Hague won the bid of the 
hosting city. The Hague, a city of half a million inhabitants, is the Dutch government resi-
dence. It likes to promote itself as a city of peace because several important international 
institutions are located in the city. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as the primary 
responsible government department) would organize the event in close cooperation with 
the city (also as its contractor) and with local and national security partners. From the 
start, the overarching goal of organizing the NSS was to host a “dignifi ed, secure and 
peaceful” summit. 
 The summit, unprecedented in scope to the Dutch organizers, would bring 58 heads 
of state, their delegations, and the world press to the Netherlands for a three-day high 
security, high profi le event in the heart of the densely populated country. The Netherlands 
is a decentralized state; thus, mayors have ultimate authority over public order and safety 
in their jurisdiction. Accommodating and transporting delegations from and to the World 
Economic Forum in The Hague would include crossing the jurisdictions of 20 different 
mayors/municipalities, two provinces, and four police districts. Security operations would 
involve the deployment of 13,000 police and 8,000 military offi cers. The impact on mobil-
ity, logistics, and business continuity was unparalleled. 
 A Ministerial Committee including the PM (chair), and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Security and Justice, Economic Affairs, Defence, and Infrastructure plus the National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security and the Mayor of The Hague would be 
the ultimate decision unit at the highest strategic level. One level below, responsibility was 
divided between two committees at the Directorate-General level (one for content/diplo-
macy and one for security of the event). Two levels below, three project groups (Sherpa 
team, NSS project team and the Security Project Group – PGV) formed the administrative 
backbone of the event organization, coordinating the work at the operational level. At all 
levels, diplomacy and security formed the pillars of the event organization. 
 The summit was successful in the eyes of the organizers and well received by the Dutch 
press and international media. No major incidents occurred, and demonstrations were 
exercised peacefully and calmly. The Dutch government concluded that its goals were met 
as the summit could be characterized as dignifi ed, secure, and peaceful. 
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 Analysis 
 We will highlight the most striking differences in our analysis of fault lines and conditions 
that seemed to relate to the differences in outcomes between the two events. 
 Problem Framing: Narrow Versus Broad 
 For the Toronto G20 Summit, several police respondents said their overarching goal 
was “to get the heads of state in and out of the summit safely,” which illustrates the 
perfect isolation of security planning in the Canadian case (interview 22). This isola-
tion stands in stark contrast to the integrated perspective on goals of the Dutch NSS 
summit organization. From the start, security was but one goal of the entire network 
responsible for the NSS planning and operations. Security concerns in The Hague (rep-
resented by the type I organizations in the network) had to fi nd a constant balance 
with the desired peaceful, undisturbed, dignifi ed and festive character of the event (rep-
resented by type II organizations such as the Foreign Offi ce which was in charge of 
hosting the Summit) as well as with the people of the city (and their local interests rep-
resented by businesses, interest groups, and residents through type III and IV organiza-
tions included in the network). Because of this compound aim, societal actors joined 
the decision-making tables at all governance levels. They brought in different views 
on how to deal with demonstrations, how to groom public opinion, and how to mini-
mize security restrictions that hindered city life and business continuity. Their interests 
were constantly weighing into the security planning. The Dutch actors had experience 
with this inclusive approach from prior events and their constitutional setup of local 
autonomy ensured that local demands for a festive and peaceful event were taken into 
serious consideration. 
 Though it is unlikely that the exclusion of other interests than security in the Cana-
dian ISU’s planning efforts inspired demonstrators and violent protestors, there was 
clearly a “them” (summit/security, type I organizations) against “us” (demonstrators/media/ 
spectators – type IV) atmosphere in the city. Imposed restrictions, incurred costs, and 
the use of law enforcement related to the summit were critically received by the press. 
However, the rogue nature of the protestors and the violence they displayed in the city 
center led 81% of the Torontonians who participated in a poll to agree that the police had 
done a good job during the summit ( Chase 2010 ). Nevertheless, the escalation of violence 
between the police and the protesters probably did not favorably infl uence the public 
evaluations of the organization of the G20 Summit. 
 It seems that the integrated approach in The Hague empowered a diversity of interests. 
The compound motto ensured that interests that played a minor role in the Toronto G20 
planning (citizen mobility and public appreciation for the event) weighed in heavily in the 
NSS preparations. 
 Single Perspectives Rule: Planners Versus Operators 
 The inclusive, integrated network for preparing the NSS at the strategic and tactical level 
in the Netherlands was mirrored by a similar network at the operational level. According 
to respondents, the liaisons present in both networks ensured the operability of decisions 
taken, regular information fl ows, and reality checks between the levels. Yet six months 
before the NSS was scheduled to take place, the PGV at the strategic level started to lose 
grip on the numerous expert groups created to work on specifi c issues. Each issue had 
been translated into a specifi c expert group which undermined the integrated approach 
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and the number of groups had proliferated. The PGV seized the opportunity to escalate 
the most pressing issues to the strategic level and reduce the number (45–50) of the expert 
groups considerably, to regain oversight and reduce overlap. Respondents saw the lead 
time (1.5 years) up to the event both as a benefi t and a disadvantage: it allowed both for 
the proliferation of network segments and for the time to “tame the beast we created” 
(interview 11). In any case, suffi cient time existed to carefully calibrate strategic and oper-
ational plans, practices and responses before and during the event. 
 Such time was lacking in the Toronto case, in the four months after the Harper adminis-
tration selected the MTCC venue as the G20 location. In the G8/G20 preparations phase, 
an operational network that mirrored the collaborative network of strategic planners (all 
type I organizations, but at different hierarchical levels) existed on paper but not in prac-
tice. Much of the ISU information to the operational forces was directed top down to the 
chiefs of the operational services and in fact given only a few days prior to the event to 
the offi cers involved in the operation. Confusion reigned about the exact plans, strategies, 
and security operations, as operators were not included in the planning dialogue. As one 
of the lead planners of the G20 recalled in an interview: “I should have ensured that the 
deputy chief and chiefs of the [operational] services were involved [and] understood the 
plans. I did not do that.” In the end, the chief was able to say 
 I didn’t know. I learned my lesson there, and if I ever do this again, I would defi nitely 
make sure that we were on the same page. Responsibility and accountability were on 
paper, but that didn’t matter. Nobody took that to the chief of police to check if he 
understood. 
 (interview 19) 
 System architecture between planners and operators in the G20 case clearly differed 
from the situation in The Hague, as operational actors were not involved in the G20 secu-
rity planning, hindering collaborative governance and ultimately unsettling operations 
during the G20 Summit. 
 Culture Clashes: Inward Looking Versus Outreaching 
 In both Toronto and The Hague, the local police contacted anticipated demonstrators prior 
to the summit to explain the restrictions, demonstration routes, locations, and so on. In 
order to be able to anticipate potential demonstrations and constantly update their threat 
assessments, the Dutch police used international intelligence networks to stop potential 
protestors “from getting on the bus in Italy” ’ instead of just waiting for their arrival in a 
more reactive way. In the Toronto case, the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) consisted mainly 
of key stakeholders of the ISU: the Canadian Intelligence Service (CSIS), border agencies, 
Transport Canada, and the Canadian Forces (type I and type II organizations). Although 
offi cial inquiries indicated that “collection and dissemination of intelligence through one 
central theme supported the partners in working together,” they found that “varying pro-
tocols and procedures for sharing and classifying information made information sharing 
diffi cult” ( RCMP 2014 , 10). 
 Diplomats from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (type II) proactively contacted 
organized protestors (type III and IV) to convince them of the benefi ts of the NSS in terms 
of world peace. After all, the Nuclear Security Summit aimed to reduce the risk of crimi-
nal and terrorist use of nuclear materials worldwide. Who could be against that? This 
informal marketing campaign on the NSS may have contributed to the less fi erce anti-
nuclear energy protests than for instance during the Seoul NSS of 2012. In Toronto, the 
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Community Relations Group (CRG) of the joint police organizations (all type I) reached 
out to both the citizens affected by the G20 Summit and to potential protesters (type IV 
and III respectively) to facilitate peaceful and lawful protests. However, “For the most 
part, there was little positive interaction between the CRG and the more militant activ-
ists” ( TPS 2011 , 55; interview 18). The protestors criticized the CRG for being solely 
concerned about obtaining intelligence ( RCMP 2012 ). 
 Demonstrators and security actors by nature have a prehistory of confl ict rather than 
cooperation, so collaborative actors need to take positive steps to remediate low levels of 
trust. Though the TPS did extensive fi eldwork to inform demonstrators, this was not nec-
essarily perceived as a trust-building exercise by the protesters, and the resulting protests 
do not indicate any positive effects of prior bilateral communication (Ontario Ombuds-
man 2010). By contrast, the Dutch diplomatic approach to activists, not by the security 
actors in the networks but by their colleagues from the Foreign Offi ce to positively com-
municate and fi nd agreement and support for the ultimate goals of the summit seemed to 
pay off in increasing mutual trust. 
 Both Culture Clash and Single Perspective: Mono Versus 
Multidisciplinary 
 The network in the Toronto case seemed to mainly facilitate cooperation among the 
police forces (all type I). Toronto police respondents characterized their cooperation as 
smooth, in spite of a mild historical animosity between the federal RCMP and the local 
TPS. In the Toronto case, elected offi cials representing the city, the Ontario govern-
ment or the Harper administration did not assume a strong mediating role within the 
network of stakeholders. The homogeneity of their network (police organizations only) 
led to a widely shared agreement on their mission (providing security to G20 delega-
tions). Most respondents agreed that, given the challenges, they successfully pulled off 
the task at hand. 
 In the NSS case, cooperation at the strategic level (PGV) involved the greatest possible 
variety of network partners, including the city (type II), cabinet departments (type II), 
business representatives (type III), emergency services (type I), special police forces (type 
I), intelligence agencies (type II), neighborhood communities (type IV), and the military 
(type I/II). The Chairperson of the PGV was the Deputy DG of the National Coordina-
tor of Counterterrorism and Security in the Netherlands, a Directorate-General that by 
defi nition always plays a moderating and coordinating role among a diversity of network 
partners in all its regular activities. This background may have contributed to her coor-
dinating approach and skills, allowing her to become the “honest broker” in the NSS 
preparations network. 
 The NSS network in The Hague faced an intense confl ict about the integration of com-
mand centers, six months before the NSS began. The local police demanded to include the 
local emergency services in the operational command center  on site (i.e., inside the secured 
zone). The special police forces (such as intervention squads and police intelligence groups 
part of the national police) in that command center, opposed vehemently against the pres-
ence of civilian actors. The special police forces argued that their information could not 
be shared in the presence of non-police actors. The local police escalated this issue because 
they valued the presence of their highly trusted local emergency counterparts for an inte-
grated operational approach. In the end, the PGV at the strategical level intervened and 
included the relevant non-security actors in the command center on site. According to the 
local respondents, the issue harmed the overall reputation of the police in the eyes of other 
emergency response organizations, but the resulting integrated command center worked 
well before and during the summit. 
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 Table 3.4 Overview of main findings 
 Fault line  G20  NSS 
Culture clash  Inclusive toward protestors 
(managed by type 
I organizations – security focus) 
 Mainly type I organizations (inward 
looking). 
 Constrained information 
sharing through protocols and 
procedures 
 Inclusive toward protestors 
(managed by type II 
organizations – content focus) 
 Outward looking. 
 Ability to use international 
information sharing and 
cooperation networks (EU wide) 
Problem framing  “Us versus them” framing (type 
I versus type IV organizations). 
 Narrow goal-setting (safe and 
secure) 
 Collective, inclusive decision 
making (all types of 
organizations). 
 Broad goal-setting (festive, safe, 
peaceful) 
Single perspectives  Short-term preparation seen as 
disadvantage 
 Hierarchical “tension” (RCMP lead 
in TPS area). 
 Clear strategic/operational 
division 
 Long-term preparation seen 
as both advantage and 
disadvantage 
 Dispersed “tensions”: who is 
doing what? (losing oversight). 
 Integrated/mirrored strategic/
operational organization 
Source: Table Created by Authors 
 Conclusions: Stay on the Slack Line 
 Though we cannot conclude that the observed differences of how fault lines prevailed 
in the cases causally relate to security outcomes of the two summits, the contrasts are 
insightful. The absence of scholarly research into such differences and the recurrence of 
summits make this exploration a valuable effort. Our cases confi rm the importance of 
collaborative efforts between organization types to deal with crises or threats that ignore 
functional boundaries. Such collaborative efforts require an inclusive approach to secu-
rity. Not surprisingly, taking on board societal actors (type III and IV in Dynes’s typology) 
is imperative to meet societal security challenges. 
 Meanwhile, this inclusive approach can generate its own fault lines when the number of 
actors increases so much that a proliferation of different expert groups takes place, each 
embracing a single-perspective specialization. A network administrative organization that 
bears the responsibility to safeguard the sustainability and coherence of the network may 
be required to smoothen cooperation between the partners ( Kenis and Provan 2009 ). The 
Dutch case study revealed the vital importance of a coordinating actor that served as an 
“honest broker” between the different interests involved (cf.  Kuipers and Swinkels 2018 ). 
 Another fi nding is that smooth network cooperation can be deceptive when the network 
only involves the same type of organizations. When these organizations are horizontally 
related, such as different police organizations in the Canadian case (all type I), network 
collaboration can still require much effort because of disputes on tasks and responsibili-
ties. Hierarchy within the network can help to make collaboration succeed in terms of 
reconciling actors involved in a single mission, as it did in Toronto (with the RCMP taking 
the lead in securing world leaders at all cost). The process of collaboration could even be 
characterized as a programmatic success ( Bovens 2010 ). Yet, collaboration will still likely 
fail to cover societal interests and thus get harmed in the long run (resulting in process fail-
ure in terms of legitimacy). Including “strangers” (from a security perspective) may gen-
erate severe culture clashes within the network in the short run but may prove benefi cial 
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to the relations with other “outsiders,” such as the protestors who were appeased by the 
diplomats in the Dutch case. 
 Practitioners must try to move from fault lines to slack lines. Slack lines fi nd their ori-
gin in climbing. They are dynamic lines between two anchor points on which people can 
train their balance. Moving from one edge to the other is a delicate, balancing act that 
requires cooperation of many different muscles in the body. Due to the wobbly line that 
moves with you as you go, long-term training to stay on the line is essential in order to 
cross from one point for another. As we have outlined in this chapter, preparing for secure 
summits can lead to dramatic outcomes when organizations fall off slack lines into fault 
lines. The lessons from both cases concerning problem framing, culture clashes, and single 
perspective rules challenge practitioners to train, prepare, and practice the balancing act 
from event planning and preparation to secure summit operations. 
 The fi ndings of this study can guide further research on securing high profi le security 
events through collaboration in governance networks. Collaborative networks in secu-
rity and crisis management deserve more scholarly attention than they currently receive 
( Kuipers and Welsh 2017 , 280). High profi le security events will always be there, and in 
recent years, global summits are on the rise ( Bradford, Linn, and Martin 2008 ). When 
demonstrators may become more mobile and militant against authorities in a polarized 
world, authorities responsible for public order cannot afford to ignore these lessons for 
collaborative governance in security settings. 
 Notes 
 1.   Data available upon request. 
 2.   Within the controlled access and restricted access zone. 
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 Position/role  Date 
 1  World Forum, The Hague, event manager  19 August 2015 
 2  The Hague Police – strategic leadership 1  10 August 2015 
 3  The Hague Police – strategic leadership 2  04 November 2015 
 4  The Hague Police – operational leadership  24 September 2015 
 5  National Police – strategic leadership  01 December 2015 
 6  Ministry of Foreign Affairs – operational leadership  07 October 2015 
 7  Ministry of Foreign Affairs – strategic leadership  24 September 2015 
 8  Ministry of Security and Justice – staff project group security 
(PGV) 
 26 August 2015 
 9  Ministry of Security and Justice – strategic leadership Crisis 
Management Unit 
 07 September 2015 
 10  Ministry of Security and Justice – strategic leadership project 
group security (PGV) 
 09 September 2015 
 11  Ministry of Security and Justice – strategic leadership project 
group security (PGV) 
 31 August 2015 
 12  Ministry of Security and Justice – staff project group security 
(PGV) – logistics 
 10 August 2015 
 13  Ministry of Security and Justice – staff project group security 
(PGV) – security heads of state 
 26 August 2015 
 14  Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation – staff project 
group security (PGV) 
 15 September 2015 
 15  The Hague City – City manager  02 September 2015 
 16  The Hague City – NSS project leadership  23 July 2015 
 17  The Hague City – strategic leadership security  17 August 2015 
 18  Toronto Police Service – communications manager  20 August 2015 
 19  Toronto Police Service – strategic leadership, project leader  19 August 2015 
 20  Office of the Independent Police Review – lead researcher  25 August 2015 
 21  Royal Canadian Mounted Police – strategic leadership 1, 
project leader 
 29 August 2015 
 22  Royal Canadian Mounted Police – strategic leadership 2  26 August 2015 
 23  Peel Regional Police – strategic leadership  24 August 2015 
 24  Metro Toronto Convention Centre – event managers (2)  20 August 2015 
 25  Toronto Emergency Services – operational leadership  25 August 2015 
 26  Ontario Provincial Police Association – strategic leadership  19 August 2015 
 Appendix I 
 List of Respondents 
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